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Iraq represents a significant historical case for assessing the effectiveness of deterrent 
threats on containing the ambitions of would-be nuclear states. The Conflict Records Research 
Center (CRRC) at the National Defense University houses copies of a vast collection of records 
captured from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq during the 2003 Gulf War. These records contain many 
audio recordings and direct transcripts of high-level meetings between Saddam Hussein and his 
advisors and senior cabinet, shedding unprecedented light on Saddam’s thinking throughout the 
life of Iraq’s nuclear program and the two Gulf Wars. These records allow for a more thorough 
understanding of the motivations and intentions of Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons programs, the non-use of chemical weapons in the 1991 Gulf War, and what effect U.S. 
deterrent capabilities and threats had on Iraq’s actions. 
With funding from the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems and 
Concepts for Countering WMD, Scott D. Sagan at the Center for International Security and 
Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University undertook a project to facilitate the translation and 
analysis of sources from the CRRC archives to learn lessons about preventing proliferation and 
deterring WMD use and to discuss these lessons with U.S. government officials. The project 
succeeded in improving our understanding of Iraqi decision-making regarding WMD and 
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2 Thank you to Benjamin Buch and Reid Pauly for assistance with preparation of this final report.  
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deterrence, and provided comparative lessons to be learned from this history for U.S. nuclear 
weapons policy toward new and potential nuclear weapons proliferators.  
This project had four categories of deliverables: translation of documents, commissioning 
of documents analysis papers, hosting of workshops to discuss lessons learned, and policy 
outreach efforts.  All were achieved.  
 
Workshops 
 The project hosted three major meetings. The first was a meeting of an advisory group, 
called together at the National Defense University in Washington, DC to identify key questions 
to be answered by the project and develop a strategy for research. Participants included: 
Christopher Alkhoury, Seth Carus, Seth Center, Norman Cigar, Charles Duelfer, Michael 
Eisenstadt, Lorry Fenner, Gregory Koblentz, David Mack, Scott Norwood, David Palkki, Reid 
Pauly, Ken Pollack, Scott Sagan, Margaret Sloane, Amy Smithson, Kevin Woods, and Judith 
Yaphe. This advisory body set the scope of the project and helped to identify key researchers and 
discussants for the substantive archival research and participants for future workshops.  
The second meeting was a workshop held in Vienna, Austria, where authors presented 
their commissioned papers to an elite group of scholars, former policymakers, and former 
scientific advisors to Saddam Hussein. Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Rolf Ekéus, Gudrun Harrer, 
David Palkki, and Kevin Woods all contributed papers to the workshop. Other participants 
commented on these papers based on personal experiences and interpretation of the new archival 
evidence available on a password-protected website. This small group of highly qualified 
scholars and former practitioners engaged in two days of intense and in-depth discussion of the 
motivations, intentions, capabilities, and decision-making of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons 
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program. The paper authors benefitted immensely from commentary from Iraqi participants, who 
were there on the ground in Iraq to witness many of the milestones of the nuclear weapons 
program that were being discussed. Overall the participants provided important competing 
perspectives and interpretations of the facts presented in the documents. Indeed, some of the 
most interesting lessons learned emerged from understanding how each side perceived and 
misperceived the actions of the other during the interactions between Iraq and the West.  
The third and final workshop was held at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, 
DC and was co-hosted by the Wilson Center’s Nuclear Proliferation International History 
Project. This workshop, entitled “Deterring New Nuclear Weapons States?: Lessons From 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq,” presented the final research papers commissioned by this project, and 
approximately 40 members of the academic and policy communities gathered to discuss the 
lessons learned from this new evidence and how they can be applied to the challenge of deterring 
new nuclear states today. The workshop consisted of two distinct panel discussions. The first 
panel focused specifically on the case of Iraq and what these captured records reveal about Iraqi 
decision-making. Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Charles Duelfer, Rolf Ekéus, and David Palkki 
presented on this panel and Robert Litwak chaired the discussion. The second panel broadened 
the scope to apply these deterrence lessons to the cases of Iran, North Korea, and unidentified 
potential future proliferants. Former and current policymakers Victor Cha, John Harvey, and 
Gary Samore spoke on the second panel and Scott Sagan chaired the discussion. John Harvey’s 
comments were off-the-record, but prompted a fruitful discussion. In conjunction with this final 
workshop, the CRRC publicly released 26 of the many translated documents prepared for this 
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This project commissioned and distributed five papers which were written based on the 
captured records. 
 
Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “A Baath Bomb? Iraq’s nuclear program (1956-81)” 
Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer wrote about the genesis of the Iraqi nuclear program. The 
traditional interpretation is that Saddam ordered a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s that was 
interrupted by the Israeli strike on the Osirak reactor in 1981. A closer review of new archival 
evidence and interviews with senior Iraqi scientists reveals a more complicated picture. Through 
the 1950s and 1960s Iraq’s program was focused on education and exploration, its nuclear 
program was not yet even directed towards nuclear power. In 1968 the Ba’ath party came to 
power and in the early 1970s some nuclear scientists began advocating a weapons program as a 
way to get more funding and prestige for nuclear research.  
In the late 1970s, the goals of the program were ambiguous. Nuclear scientists that were 
not members of the Baath party were focused mainly on nuclear experiments, while some in the 
Baathist party thought that the Osirak reactor, purchased from France in the early 1970s, could be 
used in a breakout program. The program stalled after the Iranian revolution when two senior 
scientists were jailed, Jafar D. Jafar on suspicion of being a member of the Dawa party and 
Husain Shahristani for protesting his colleague’s arrest.  
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The 1981 attack, Braut-Hegghammer contends, far from stalling Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, 
was the catalyst that restarted Iraq’s nuclear program and encouraged a determined and large-
scale, but covert, pursuit of nuclear weapons. Braut-Hegghammer concludes: 
1. Members of the nuclear establishment are often faced with bureaucratic incentives to both 
exaggerate capabilities and encourage a weapons program, such as bringing prestige or 
greater funding to their agencies. 
2. Early nuclear programs often do not have well developed goals and the leadership may be 
ambivalent about nuclear weapons ambitions.  
3. The use of force by an adversary can have a counterproductive effect if the goal is to stop 
a nuclear weapons program, especially if that program is stalled or ambiguous. In the case 
of Iraq, the Israeli attack may have helped unify the opinions of the Iraqi leadership, 
bureaucracy, and scientific establishment on the need for an Iraqi nuclear deterrent. 
 
Rolf Ekéus, “WMD, Iraq, and the USA”  
Rolf Ekéus, former head of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, wrote a paper 
reviewing the history of UNSCOM and commenting on other aspects of the 1991 and 2003 Gulf 
Wars. Ekéus notes that Saddam’s high level of popularity following the end of the Iran-Iraq War 
helps to explain his decision to invade Kuwait. While the Iran-Iraq War was difficult from a 
military perspective, it was a highly successful war from a political perspective. Saddam got the 
political backing of every Arab state except for Syria and also received intelligence support from 
the United States, attack planes from France, and SCUD missiles from the Soviet Union. 
Saddam’s popularity at the beginning of the Gulf War can thus help explain his decision to invade 
Kuwait. 
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Ekéus then reviewed the history of UNSCOM, noting that the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) was the usual body to handle weapons inspection and verification. 
However, incentives in the IAEA were skewed towards certifying a program was not dangerous, 
so the U.S. pushed a decision to create a new body whose job it was to investigate non-declared 
capabilities. On April 3, 1991, UN Security Council resolution 687 called for Iraq to accept the 
unconditional removal and destruction of its stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. By June 
9, 1991, UNSCOM began its inspections. 
Rolf Ekéus recalls that initially UNSCOM cooperated closely with the IAEA in their 
activities, but eventually evolved into a separate organization tasked specifically with ferreting out 
hidden capabilities. While initially intelligence sharing between the U.S. government and 
UNSCOM was strong, it ebbed and flowed over the life of UNSCOM. Ekéus recalled that getting 
a U2 spy plane was enormously helpful to UNSCOM and that the Clinton administration was 
much less supportive of UNSCOM than the Bush administration. 
The biggest problem UNSCOM faced was selling cooperation to the Iraqis. The easiest 
selling point was the removal of sanctions, but this would only work if sanctions could be credibly 
removed after Iraq was decreed free of WMD. However, lifting sanctions was politically 
untenable for the American leadership, weakening the credibility of such carrots. 
Overall, Ekéus notes that UNSCOM was set up to help cover the weaknesses in the IAEA 
inspection regime, in particular the fact that the IAEA wasn’t set up to find non-declared facilities. 
Moreover, UNSCOM was constrained by its intelligence capacity and by the level of political 
support from the United States. 
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Gudrun Harrer, “The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Role and Perspective on Iraqi 
Nuclear Dismantlement 1991-2003”  
Gudrun Harrer wrote a paper based on the documents housed at CRRC and documents 
that she received access to at the IAEA Action Team archives. Through her paper she tells the 
IAEA perspective of the inspections of Iraq and highlights the successes and failures of the 
IAEA approach to the case of Iraqi proliferation. While it is easy to blame the IAEA for failing 
to prevent Iraq from developing a nuclear weapons program, the truth is much more nuanced, as 
she argues that the IAEA may be faulted for making unwise judgments, but in the context of 
limited access to Iraq and a nonintrusive inspection culture. Harrer argues that the IAEA did not 
cover anything up to allow an Iraqi program to incubate.  
Harrer’s account of the bureaucratic conflicts between the IAEA and UNSCOM in the 
context of U.S. political pressure sheds valuable light on the successful and unsuccessful tactics 
employed to rid Iraq of WMD. Her detailed description of the inspections procedures reveals the 
underappreciated importance of luck and coincidence in the ultimate success of Iraqi 
disarmament. 
 
David Palkki, “Calculated Ambiguity, Nuclear Weapons, and Saddam’s Strategic Restraint” 
David Palkki’s paper focused on Saddam Hussein’s choice not to use chemical weapons 
during the 1991 Gulf War. This presents a historical puzzle given Iraq’s vast stockpiles of 
chemical weapons and prior use of chemical weapons to great effect during the Iran-Iraq war. 
Four primary explanations for non-use have been advanced, two of which place much faith in the 
effectiveness of U.S. deterrent threats.  
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1. Saddam was deterred from using chemical weapons by the threat of American nuclear 
retaliation. Proponents of this explanation have pointed to threats issued in a meeting on 
January 9, 1991, by Secretary of State James Baker and in a letter written by President 
George H.W. Bush. 
2. Saddam was deterred from using chemical weapons because he feared that use would 
cause the United States to shift to a policy of regime change. 
3. Saddam did not use chemical weapons because he thought they would be militarily 
ineffective against American forces. 
4. Saddam wanted to use chemical weapons, but for some reason was unable to launch. 
 
Palkki argues that the first explanation is the most accurate, but thinks that Secretary 
Baker’s threats and President Bush’s letter had little to do with the strength of this threat. Instead 
Saddam’s fear of American nuclear use came from pre-existing beliefs. As early as April 1990, 
the Iraqis were studying how to react when “Baghdad is struck by atomic bombs.” Saddam 
worried that casualty aversion would lead the U.S. to resort to nuclear weapons. Saddam was also 
convinced that the U.S. nuclear threat was credible because of U.S. nuclear use against Japan in 
the Second World War and because of a misguided belief that the United States had used 
chemical weapons against enemy forces in the Vietnam War. Tariq Aziz is quoted as stating in 
the captured records that if Iraq were to use chemical weapons, “we would give them an excuse 
for a nuclear attack.” 
Palkki argues that regime change as a deterrent threat was unlikely because Saddam 
expected the United States to pursue a policy of regime change whether Saddam used chemical 
weapons or not. For a deterrent threat to be credible, it must be believable not just that the 
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punishment will be applied if the other state performs a forbidden action but also that punishment 
will be withheld if the other state refrains. This same logic could be applied to the nuclear threat 
as well. If Saddam thought the U.S. was likely to use nuclear weapons whether or not Iraq used 
chemical weapons, the nuclear threat was not likely to serve as a deterrent. Palkki acknowledges 
this shortcoming, but contended the Iraqis believed that use of chemical weapons would at least 
make U.S. nuclear use more likely. He also pointed out that the fact that Saddam went to war 
while still believing that American use of nuclear weapons was a real possibility should dampen 
the optimism of those who believe war is highly unlikely under the shadow of a nuclear threat.4 
Palkki also discusses the impact of the revelation in Brent Scowcroft’s memoirs that 
nuclear threats during the 1991 Gulf War were bluffs, thus weakening the credibility of future 
nuclear deterrent threats by the United States. Despite reading Scowcroft’s memoirs, Saddam was 
still worried in meetings about the possibility of the United States using nuclear weapons. 
However, one participant suggested that the fear of decreased effectiveness might have led the 
U.S. to bluff “louder” in the lead up to the 2003 Gulf War than in the lead up to the first. 
Finally, Palkki views ambiguous signals as ineffective for deterrence because they are 
neither clear nor binding. The most effective signals for deterrence in Palkki’s view are those that 
clearly link action with punishment and are delivered publicly so that leaders in the country 
issuing a threat face some cost for not following through on their threat. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Rolf Ekéus argued that part of the decision not to use chemical weapons on the battlefield could be explained by the 
reduction of Iraqi production capacity as a result of American bombing at the start of the Gulf War. While the Iraqis 
had large stockpiles of nerve agents, the effectiveness of these agents was reduced sharply with time. In the Iran-Iraq 
war, the Iraqis adopted a just-in-time delivery system where nerve agents were sent to the front immediately after 
being produced. The destruction of Iraqi production capability prevented them from using this system and would have 
forced them to use less effective stockpiled agents or less impressive chemical agents like mustard gas. Given this 
predicted decreased effectiveness and the sophistication of American countermeasures as compared to the Iranians, 
the Iraqis likely calculated that chemical weapons would be less effective. 
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Kevin Woods, “Testing the Lessons of Coercion: The Case of Iraq - October 1994” 
Kevin Woods’ research paper used new evidence uncovered in the CRRC documents to 
shed light on a specific case of the debated effectiveness of U.S. coercion: Iraq’s military build-
up along the Kuwaiti border in October 1994. The events of October 1994 have largely been 
shrouded in mystery. It is often assumed that Saddam was coerced in October 1994 when he 
moved troops to the Kuwaiti border, only to back down.  
Woods reassesses these events of October 1994 and identifies three main goals of 
Saddam Hussein. Through his deployments, Woods argues, Saddam sought to portray Iraq as a 
victim, gain a clearer understanding of inspections and timeline of lifting of sanctions, and he 
wanted to elicit support from Russia and China and create opportunities for them to help Iraq. 
Prior to the October 1994 troop movements, Iraq issued public pronouncements that were very 
similar to the public pronouncements and threats made against Kuwait prior to the 1990 
invasion.  
After he backed down, Saddam seems to have been pleased with what happened in 
October 1994, though he probably would have been even happier if the US had launched an 
airstrike. Iraq thought it saw progress in what the Russians started to say after the incident 
regarding the necessity of dealing with the Kuwait-Iraq border issue, along with lifting of 
sanctions. Woods concludes that Saddam intended not to reinvade Kuwait in 1994, but to 
manufacture a crisis. 	  
Individual paper authors have been encouraged to publish their research papers 
independently and will continue to work with Scott Sagan as appropriate.  
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International Studies Association Roundtable  
This project held a roundtable discussion at the International Studies Association 
conference in April 2013 on “Can New Nuclear Weapons States Be Deterred?” Participants in 
the panel were: Scott Sagan, Vipin Narang, Marc Trachtenberg, David Palkki, James Fearon, and 
Malfrid Braut‐Hegghammer. The event was attended by approximately 100 people, mostly 
scholars and graduate students. The panel drew heavily upon the Iraqi case for evidence of how 
new nuclear weapons states might behave. It was a first attempt at broadening the lessons of our 
project on Iraq to draw conclusions for the future effective practice of deterrence.  
 
Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
The research for this project coalesced into four main themes: 
 
1. The effectiveness of U.S. deterrent threats in the 1991 Gulf War. 
Debate about Iraq’s non-use of chemical weapons in the 1991 Gulf War has centered on 
whether the United States’ threat to use nuclear weapons or to depose Saddam Hussein played a 
larger role in constraining Saddam’s decision-making. The new records point to a possible third 
option: that Saddam viewed chemical weapons as a deterrent threat to prevent an American march 
on Baghdad and he did want to use them earlier in a war to save them for continued deterrence of 
regime change or retaliation in the event that the coalition forces attacked Baghdad. Saddam also 
fought the 1991 Gulf War despite his belief that American first-use of nuclear weapons was a real 
possibility.  
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An event that has been highlighted as a case of deterrent failure is the decision to burn the 
Iraqi oil fields in 1991. However, new evidence suggests that Saddam Hussein did not order the 
burning of the oil fields; instead a commander in the field made this decision when he could not 
communicate with Baghdad and feared the worst. This highlights a tension in targeting command 
and control structures; destroying an enemy’s command and control makes a war effort more 
likely to be successful, but also makes the behavior of an adversary more erratic, which is 
especially dangerous in the case of nuclear armed states. 
 
2. Credible signaling in a weak information environment. 
Misperception played a crucial role in Iraq-U.S. relations throughout the 1990s and served 
as a major roadblock to successful deterrence. Saddam assumed that the U.S. had perfect 
intelligence, so in situations where the U.S. was operating under bad intelligence, Saddam 
assumed U.S. actions were driven by other motives. The effectiveness of the U.S. decision to use 
ambiguous and private signals to communicate deterrent threats was also a matter of debate. 
Through the Iraq case, we can observe three main stages of deterrence where 
misperception can play a pernicious role. First, if the threatening state has a false impression of 
what the other state values, this leads to a threat that is improperly targeted. Second, if the 
threatened state fails to realize a deterrent threat has been made or fails to properly perceive which 
actions have been linked with a deterrent threat, this leads to a misunderstanding about the basic 
nature of the deterrent threat. Third, if the threatening state falsely believes that the threatened 
state has crossed a line when it has not, this can lead to a triggering of the punishment at an 
improper time. Overall, a state should be less confident in the effectiveness of deterrence in the 
presence of a weak information environment. 
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In the case of North Korea and Iran, the U.S. faces channels of communication that are as 
weak as or weaker than those between the U.S. and Iraq throughout the 1990s. The impact this 
weak information environment had on the effectiveness of signaling in the case of Iraq is worth 
reflecting on as the United States attempts similar strategic communication with Iran and North 
Korea. 
In order for deterrent threats to be credible, the threat-issuing state must be able to credibly 
commit not to fulfill the threatened punishment if the other nation does not cross the line. This is 
particularly problematic if, as in the case of the U.S., the same deterrent punishment has been 
linked to multiple actions by the other state. The U.S. threatened regime change if Saddam did not 
pull out of Kuwait, and if he used chemical weapons. Thus Iraq perceived that the United States 
sought to replace the regime regardless of Iraqi actions and that the United States would march to 
Baghdad whether or not Iraq used WMD. 
 
3. Crisis instability and the threat of nuclear conflict. 
For Iran and North Korea, the most likely scenario for use of nuclear weapons would be in 
an escalating crisis while their nuclear forces are still relatively small. The caution encouraged by 
nuclear weapons may not be enough to prevent nuclear conflict once conventional conflicts begin 
or if small nuclear forces are vulnerable to preemptive attacks. The most effective way to prevent 
use of nuclear weapons in spiraling crisis situations is to diffuse crises before military force is 
used or before preemptive options become perceived as necessary. 
 
4. Differing interests in new nuclear programs. 
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The Iraqi nuclear program began with ambiguous goals and was pulled in multiple 
directions by different bureaucratic interests. The main advocates for building a nuclear weapon 
were members of the nuclear establishment who saw a weapons program as a way to acquire 
extra funding and prestige. 
Outside force can sometimes have a counter-productive effect if the goal is to stop a 
nuclear weapons program, especially if that program is stalled or ambiguous. In the case of Iraq, 
the Israeli attack on the Osirak reactor in 1981 helped unify the opinions of the Iraqi leadership, 
bureaucracy, and scientific establishment on the need for an Iraqi nuclear deterrent.  
This research project also identified lessons (both specific to Iraq and more generally) for 
perceptions and misperceptions in bilateral relations that could impact the effectiveness of 
deterrence, and on the study of nuclear weapons development programs: 
  
• Nonproliferation Research Lesson: This research demonstrates how our traditional 
scholarly categories states seeking “acquisition” or “non-acquisition” of nuclear weapons 
leave huge grey areas for states that want to leave options open or that aren’t even sure 
what they want or even what capabilities they think they can get.  
• Projecting Clear Decision-making Lesson: We too often think that decisions in a country 
are made just by the head of state or at least always sanctioned by the leader, but the truth 
is often more complex (there was a lot of stove-piping that made Iraq’s nuclear weapons 
program chaotic).  
• Domestic Politics Lesson: We systematically understate the importance of domestic 
politics in explaining foreign actions; or we don’t appreciate the randomness of 
underlying processes.  
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• Perception of U.S. Doctrine Lesson: We do not always appreciate the degree to which 
other countries fear that the U.S. might use nuclear weapons first in a crisis or conflict.  
• Rampant Misperceptions Lesson: Even when Iraq tried to do the right thing and go above 
and beyond to ensure that there were no CBW prior to 2003 (e.g., by sending chemical 
decontamination trucks to old sites to double check that no stores of CBW remained) 
those actions were held up by the U.S. as evidence of new CBW capabilities.  
• Differing Timeframes Lesson: During the course of their relationship, the U.S. was 
operating on a much shorter time horizon than Iraq. Saddam Hussein was thinking and 
taking actions in terms of a legacy he hoped would stretch centuries. Interpreting his 
actions through the lens of a Washington time frame often led to misperception. For 
example, Saddam didn’t even view the 1991 war as a defeat because he had taken on the 
major superpower and retained control of Iraq. Timeframes matter to perceiving and 
assessing the values of an adversary.  
 
Overall, the captured Iraqi records provide new evidence on the WMD program and 
deterrence failures in 1991 and 2003. The complex history of misperceptions and ineffective 
signaling in the past also raises important questions about the degree to which we can depend on 
deterrence to work with potential new nuclear states in the future.  
Scott Sagan briefed the following U.S. policymakers during and after the project: (1) 
John Harvey, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and 
Biological Defense Programs; (2) James N. Miller, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; (3) 
Brad Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy)5; and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Brad Roberts has since left the Department of Defense, but held this position at the time of discussions.   
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(4) Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, White House Coordinator for Defense Policy, Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Arms Control.  All were very interested in the findings of the 
study and are eager to receive additional papers based on the documents in the future. Policy 
outreach meetings will continue to be conducted on the conclusions of this project.  
Scott Sagan would like to thank all project participants for their dedication to this project 
and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering 
WMD for their generous support of this important research.  
